After the events in La Cocha, the five defendants were arrested and put on trial before national criminal judges. 8 At the same time, three indigenous leaders that heard the case were arrested for kidnapping, torture, mistreatment, and extortion. Both cases were referred to the Constitutional Court, but no final decision has been adopted yet.
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The La Cocha case is one of many cases that show the polarization in the country regarding ICL. The debate has many faces: the scope of the indigenous authorities' jurisdiction, access to justice of indigenous people, their right to self-determination, the role of women, the cooperation between 5 ICL is the set of rules and procedures based on the uses and customs, but not limited to them, that indigenous peoples utilize to regulate their internal affairs, as a system of social control. This set is not limited to regulations concerning contentious issues (conflict resolution, application of penalties for violation of the rules), but includes regulations relating to land management, spiritual and civil matters and regulatory authorities, in many cases difficult to separate from the set of everyday cultural practices of these groups. Authorities implementing these regulations may be different (central, segmental, or magical-religious) or concomitant. Finally, these rights are usually considered ancient legal traditions, pre-existing national law, found with different degrees of external influence on indigenous peoples in the region (see, The aim of this research is to contribute to the debate on one particular issue: indigenous corporal punishments and the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatments and punishments. From an
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) perspective, my purpose is to show that not all indigenous corporal punishments amount to forbidden acts. I will not try to undermine the prohibition of torture, instead, using the elements of the concept of 'torture' and 'cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishments' (CIDP) given by IHRL, I will show that certain indigenous corporal punishments do not fulfill all the requirements of torture or CIDP. I will also demonstrate that despite the views of several international bodies of the contrary, the culture of a society is always present in what it considers acceptable suffering for the assessment of the elements of torture and CIDP.
The importance of answering the question of 'which corporal punishments amount to torture or CIDP?'
does not only have academic value, but also practical. On the one hand, the academic literature on indigenous corporal punishments in Ecuador is mainly circumscribed to descriptions and analysis made from anthropological or sociological perspectives. Perspectives from IHRL can hardly be found and are often confined to a few paragraphs of a more general study. On the other hand, up until now Ecuador has not adopted secondary laws that define and elucidate the scope of ICL, 10 and the case law of national courts on the issue is minimal, non-systematic, and reduced to a very limited number of lower courts.
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Conflicts between national law and ICL have not yet been sufficiently addressed, and national judges do not have enough guidance on the matter. Notwithstanding, due to the constitutional recognition of ICL, its 10 The Constitution of 1998 (art. 191, Constitutional Gazette, Jun. 1998) stipulated the need of a 'coordination law' between ICL and national law. Two drafts were presented on this matter, yet both were rejected (MARC SIMON reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I will not discuss corporal punishments applied outside indigenous legal proceedings, or by non-indigenous groups, or before the defendant is found guilty. Finally, although this paper is limited to the study of Ecuador's ICL, nothing prevents my conclusions from being extrapolated to other (Latin American) countries with similar realities.
As to the structure of this paper, six sections follow this introduction. Section II describes the history of legal pluralism in Ecuador. Section III makes a succinct presentation of the international documents that recognize indigenous peoples' right to maintain their systems of law. The main theoretical contribution will be presented in sections IV, V and VI, in which the concepts of torture and CIDP are analyzed; at the end of each section some preliminary conclusions will be anticipated. Section VII will close with two final conclusions: not all indigenous corporal punishments amount to forbidden acts, and the culture of a society is always a relevant factor in the assessment of torture and CIDP.
II. Legal Pluralism in Ecuador
While Ecuador has always been a legally pluralistic country, 16 where national law and ICL have coexisted even before independence from Spain, the way in which plural legal orders have been accommodated has varied considerably across time. When the Spanish Crown colonized the Tawantinsuyo (the Inca Empire) it applied a segregationist model that kept ICL only for local non serious cases between the indios, as long as it was not contrary to the Spanish religion or laws, and did not exercise an impact upon the colonial economic and political order -it was a subordinate legal pluralism.
In 1830 the independent Republic of Ecuador replaced the segregationist model by an assimilationist one; its objective was to convert the indios into citizens by lifting their colonial status, but at the same 16 Legal pluralism is the simultaneous existence of two or more legal orders pertaining to more or less the same set of activities within one socio-political space indigenous authorities have the same legal and judicial powers as national authorities.
Consequently, from a strict juridical point of view, the constitutional recognition of ICL means that the sanctions and punishments ICL provides are lawful. 24 Whether these sanctions respect the Constitution is another issue, and the second step of the analysis. According to basic principles of constitutional law, every legal provision has a presumption of constitutionality, which means that the challenged provision shall be considered constitutional and then the arguments and reasons that point to its unconstitutionality shall be discussed. 25 Therefore, indigenous corporal punishments are presumed constitutional unless proven otherwise. This is of upmost importance for the purposes of this paper. As will be discussed in section IV, lawful sanctions are not considered torture or CIDP. 24 Since national and indigenous authorities are in equal footing, they both have the notio, iudicium and imperium powers. The notio is defined as the power to hear matters that according to the national or indigenous laws are under the jurisdiction of each judge. It includes the power to summon the parties, collect evidence, make notifications, etc. The iudicium is the ability to resolve the matter under consideration. The imperium is the power to enforce the law and to implement judicial decisions. Whatever the ultimate answer to these questions, Anaya states that 'the internal decision-making dynamics that are themselves part of a cultural group identity should be the starting point'. 34 He adds that:
III. International Instruments that Protect the Right to Maintain Indigenous Laws
In any assessment of whether a particular cultural practice is prohibited rather than protected, the cultural group concerned should be accorded a certain deference for its own interpretive and decision-making processes in the application of universal human rights norms, just as states are accorded such deference. It may be paradoxical to think of universal human rights as having to accommodate diverse cultural traditions, but that is a paradox embraced by the international human rights regime by including rights of cultural integrity among the universally applicable human rights, precisely in an effort to promote common standards of human dignity in a world in which diverse cultures flourish.
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This paper will follow Anaya's logic in the assessment of indigenous corporal punishments and the prohibition of torture and CIDP.
So far I have presented the national and international law that protects the right to maintain and develop
ICL. An integral part of indigenous law is the right of indigenous peoples to punish offenses according to their culture; consequently, this power is also protected by both national and international law. The next principle. 8(3) The application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not prevent members of these peoples from exercising the rights granted to all citizens and from assuming the corresponding duties. 9(1) To the extent compatible with the national legal system and internationally recognised human rights, the methods customarily practised by the peoples concerned for dealing with offences committed by their members shall be respected. 9(2) The customs of these peoples in regard to penal matters shall be taken into consideration by the authorities and courts dealing with such cases. 34 step is to discuss whether corporal punishments as an expression of ICL are prohibited by IHRL. For that purpose, the notion of 'torture' will be studied below.
IV. Torture in International and Ecuadorian Law
Due to its particular severity, its destructive effects on the victim and on persons and communities other than the primary victim, and the metastatic tendency of its administration, torture has a special position in International Law. 36 It is undisputable that the prohibition of torture is absolute and non-derogable. It is a matter of customary international law and peremptory ius cogens norm, which remains valid even under the most difficult circumstances. 37 Yet, the definition of torture is not uniform. On the one hand, several branches of International Law have their own prohibition of torture according to the framework they cover and the goals they pursue. 38 On the other hand, the existing definitions within each branch are not always similar, do not seem to have the same elements, and the language used is not identical. The text of these two articles shows that the language used to define torture within the same branch of International Law, namely IHRL, is not identical. As to the similarities, both instruments require that the act be intentionally performed, that pain or suffering is inflicted, and that the treatment has a purpose.
Furthermore, both instruments stipulate 'lawful' sanctions as an exclusionary rule. As to the differences, the IACPPT does not use to word 'severe' to qualify the pain or suffering. This treaty also includes the use of methods intended to 'obliterate the personality' or 'diminish' the physical or mental capacities of the victim. Finally, the UNCAT, unlike the IACPPT, requires the participation of a public official. . 41 IHL is applicable in contexts of warfare; it contains rules of war that bind all the parties to an armed conflict, whether national or international. In ICrL torture as crime against humanity needs to be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack (Rome Statute, art. 7(1). In the war crime of torture the conduct must take place in the context of and be associated with an armed conflict (Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(a)(ii) and (2)(c)(i). 42 UNCAT art. 1(1) provides: 'For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.' 43 IACPPT art. 2 makes this definition: 'For the purposes of this Convention, torture shall be understood to be any act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish. The concept of torture shall not include physical or mental pain or suffering that is inherent in or solely the consequence of lawful measures, provided that they do not include the performance of the acts or use of the methods referred to in this article.' 44 However, pursuant to IACPPT art. 3, only public servants and employees, or persons acting at their instigation shall be held guilty of the crime of torture. It seems then that according to this treaty the participation of a public officer is not an element of the definition of torture, but only an issue of imputability or accountability. Art. 93 makes a definition of torture, but because it is still a draft, the definition could be completely modified by the Legislature, being impossible to make solid assessments on it. However, it can be highlighted that the tendency is to incorporate the definition of the IACPPT. The provision includes the intentionality of the perpetrator and the infliction of pain or suffering as fundamental elements. It also embraces the obliteration of the victims' personality and the diminishment of their physical or mental capacities as methods of torture. It requires though that pain or suffering be severe, which is more in consonance with the UNCAT. The purposive element is absent. It seems that for the Draft any purpose will suffice to consider any intentional act that causes severe pain and suffering as torture. One can argue that the absence of purpose is not problematic, because the stated purposes in the UNCAT and the IACPPT are only indicative and not exhaustive (J. Harper, supra note 40, at 904). Conversely, some commentators have argued: (a) that other purposes not listed in the UNCAT could be considered only if they have something in common with the purposes expressly listed (Special Rapporteur Consequently, without an accurate national definition of torture, I will consider as its elements the ones described above -intentionality, severe pain or suffering, and purpose. The next step is to question whether indigenous peoples' culture could be taken into consideration in the assessment of torture's constituent elements. I will do so by critically analyzing the case law of international human rights bodies.
Torture and Culture
The prohibition of torture has been interpreted in a way that excludes any influence of cultural arguments. 54 With this philosophy, it was stressed that 'certain acts which were classified in the past as "inhuman and degrading treatment" as opposed to "torture" could be classified differently in future'.
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One author rightly observed that the 'evolution' does not only apply to the concrete acts that could be labeled as torture. 'It equally applies to the concept of torture in se'. 56 Then, it would be undeniable that social/cultural factors play a (significant) role in this so-called 'evolution'. As IACtHR Judge García-Ramírez puts it, the 'development of the culture and sensitivity of the individuals […] may entail an evolution in the way in which certain treatment is perceived and, consequently, how it is characterized'.
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The question that follows is who may legitimately declare that such evolution has taken place? 72 The mechanism by which the 'voice' of indigenous peoples should be expressed varies depending on the scenarios. As seen above, in legislative or administrative measures the obligation of consultation must be fulfilled. In judicial procedures, indigenous peoples may be heard directly or indirectly by means of socio-legal-anthropological expertises. This type of expertise has been considered 'suitable evidence' for indigenous regulatory systems be taken into account when carrying out a legal procedure in
Lawful Sanctions
So far we have seen that torture is not a static concept; it changes in time and space. Acts that in the past were not considered torture could be tagged as such in the future. It is also possible that any given country or region 'evolves' faster by expanding the acts that amount to torture or lowering the threshold of this evil. However, before declaring that such evolution has taken place, national authorities should accord certain deference to the concerned indigenous peoples, and international bodies should verify that enough nations have moved in the same direction. Now, I will discuss a very controversial aspect of the notion of torture: the 'lawful sanction' exclusion rule.
The UNCAT and the IACPPT exclude from the concept of torture the physical or mental pain that is inherent in or incidental to 'lawful sanctions' and 'lawful measures'. 74 One may argue that since indigenous corporal punishments in Ecuador are implicitly recognized by the Constitution, because it broadly protects indigenous peoples' right to maintain their ICL, such punishments are lawful and thus excluded from the notion of torture. However, it is not that simple. The lawfulness of the punishment is not only limited to national law, but also to IHRL. The question then is to analyze if corporal punishments are acceptable sanctions in International Law. That is the purpose of the next section, where I will also discuss two other types of punishments: imprisonment and the death penalty. I will show that IHRL is willing to accept imprisonment and capital punishment, but at the same time rejects corporal punishments, even though the former may cause more suffering than the latter. Finally, I will discuss how the acceptablity or proportionality of punishments is unavoidably linked with the moral values and legal principles of a society. Culture, therefore, is always present in the determination of the lawful nature of sanctions.
Corporal Punishments
Corporal punishments are not defined by any IHRL treaty or convention. The only non-binding definition has come from the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and read as follows: 'The Committee defines "corporal" or "physical" punishment as any punishment in which physical force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however light'.
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Some countries expressed that corporal punishment should not be considered to constitute torture or mistreatment if it is duly prescribed under the national law. 76 The Special Rapporteur on torture, Mr.
Nigel Rodly, responded that:
'the "lawful sanctions" exclusion must necessarily refer to those sanctions that constitute practices widely accepted as legitimate by the international community, such as deprivation of liberty through imprisonment, which is common to almost all penal systems. Deprivation of liberty, however unpleasant, as long as it comports with basic internationally accepted standards, such as those set forth in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, is no doubt a lawful sanction. By contrast, the Special Rapporteur cannot accept the notion that the administration of such punishments as stoning to death, flogging and amputation -acts which would be unquestionably unlawful in, say, the context of custodial interrogation -can be deemed lawful simply because the punishment has been authorized in a procedurally legitimate manner, i.e. through the sanction of legislation, administrative rules or judicial order. To accept this view would be to accept that any physical punishment, no matter how torturous and cruel, can be considered lawful, as long as the punishment had been duly promulgated under the domestic law of a State. Punishment is, after all, one of the prohibited purposes of torture. Moreover, regardless of which "lawful sanctions" might be As a result, it is unclear why all corporal punishments should be considered brutal or degrading in all scenarios. Certain corporal punishments may not fulfill the elements of torture, may not be severe enough to be considered cruel or inhuman, or may not be degrading in specific cultural contexts, yet IHRL seems to consider them all unlawful. Another issue is that IHRL is not consistent; it admits for other types of punishments that may cause more pain and humiliation than corporal punishments. My question here is why IHRL shall prohibit sanctions accepted by some indigenous cultures and protected by Ecuadorian law that might cause less suffering than the ones internationally considered lawful. I also believe that the acceptability of a punishment lies in, among others grounds, the culture of a society. Therefore, accepting some punishments over others that may have the same consequences in terms of suffering, pain, and shame, means that a culture is given a preferential treatment, which can hardly be acceptable in a pluralistic world. I will prove my points by analyzing the two punishments considered lawful by IHRL:
imprisonment and the death penalty.
Imprisonment
Deprivation of liberty and subsequent jail time will inevitably cause some sort of suffering or humiliation, but as long as the manner and method used to execute the measure do not exceed the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, the persons are detained in conditions which are compatible with their human dignity, and the detainee's health and welfare are adequately warranted, there is no conflict under IHRL.
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Individuals could be deprived of their freedom for decades, even for life; 93 but such harsh suffering is neither torture nor CIDP, because imprisonment is considered a lawful sanction.
In our modern democracies the power to punish has shifted and its exercise is shown to us as 'humane', but this is not anything but a disguise of the violence that continues to be perpetrated, although this time the violence is not self-evident. The modern punishment boasts not directly harming the physical body of a person, when in reality it does, only in a more subtle, yet reifying and alienating manner. The body of the individuals is not only confined to a given space, but their will, thought, truths, and patterns of reference are constantly and stealthily affected in a perverse way we deem 'humane'. 94 Indigenous people in detention usually are in a more vulnerable situation. They frequently are extracted from their cultural environment to be inserted in a completely different setting, far from their home communities with little contact with their families. 95 They often suffer restrictions on their cultural rights, such as access to their spiritual leaders, or limitations on religious practices; 96 sometimes they cannot even talk in their own language. 97 Yet, their suffering is not torture or ill-treatment.
Conversely, in most cases, after the traditional ceremony were indigenous authorities carried out the physical punishments and the cleansing rituals, the defendants have been purified, have apologized to the affected, have promised not to engage in such failure again, and have pledged to compensate the damage.
The community trusts them, and the broken order and harmony are restored, which is cause for celebration. The defendants are taken to share meals and chicha (traditional beverage). They recovered their position as members of the group.
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I do not dispute that 'deprivation of liberty through imprisonment […] is common to almost all penal systems'; 99 that is to say, that most cultures/societies in the world consider imprisonment lawful. My point is that imprisonment causes pain, suffering, and humiliation, but we are willing to accept that because it is our way to punish. We tolerate that trough deprivation of liberty and its inherent sacrifices certain legitimate aims will be achieved. However, there are other ways to punish crimes and to achieve the goals that other cultures consider legitimate. These other ways sometimes might cause less damage to the defendants and their families than imprisonment. Rejecting this alternative forms of punishments ab initio without considering the context in which they are carried on, not only signifies that a monistic vision of punishment is forcedly imposed to dissenting cultures, which undermines the pluralistic aim IHRL must have, 100 but also that the individual whom IHRL intends to protect may be subjected to more suffering than protection.
Death Penalty
The next punishment internationally accepted is the death penalty. Capital punishment is not per se incompatible with or prohibited by IHRL, 101 but unlike imprisonment, the death penalty is not common to almost all penal systems; quite the opposite, there is a universal tendency to abolish this sanction.
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Yet, it is still permitted for by IHRL.
From the recognition of the death penalty as a lawful sanction, three conclusions can be drawn: (a) IHRL accords a certain deference to some societies/cultures in the establishment of penalties, and since such deference is possible, it may be accorded to other societies/cultures; (b) IHRL is willing to accept the suffering and humiliation produced by the death penalty, which (most likely) are more intense than the ones produced by corporal punishments; and (c) the death penalty contradicts the idea that only punishments that are common to most legal systems of the world could be regarded as lawful by IHRL.
Preliminary Conclusion I
My argument so far is twofold. First, I uphold that culture has a role to play in the assessment of torture.
The evolving nature of this evil allows us to classify as torture acts that in the past were tolerated.
Moreover, our moral values and legal principles determine which punishments are lawful and therefore excluded from the scope of the prohibition of torture. Second, I maintain that corporal punishment shall 100 R. Perry, supra note 31, at 114. 101 However, the death penalty is strictly limited, see, ACHR art. shall proceed in such a manner that indigenous peoples' right to consultation is respected and their voice is heard. Similarly, if only a small part of the international community considers that certain acts amount to torture, such a view cannot be imposed upon the rest of nations. A consensus in the region or in the world is needed, and regional and universal bodies must discover this consensus, because an 'evolution'
that takes place in a limited sector of the international community, although important, cannot have unlimited effects in the entire world.
The consensus is only helpful to ascertain if the level of suffering caused by the act and its motives are permissible. For instance, there is a consensus that the suffering imprisonment produces is permissible.
Moreover, there is no consensus yet that the suffering produced by reducible life imprisonment for adults is impermissible. Additionally, the consensus that nations have reached not always encompasses less suffering. Prison may cause in certain cases much more suffering than corporal punishment. Finally, we should bear in mind that even with no consensus some punishments are still acceptable under IHRL. This is the case of the death penalty, the ultimate form of corporal punishment.
Taking all of the above into consideration, a limited margin of appreciation should be granted to the States, so they can accommodate other types of sanctions that are considered lawful by indigenous peoples. The criterions that must guide us in determine which acts amount to torture are the elements of this evil and the cultural context in which the acts take place. That is the purpose of the next section.
V.
Assessing the Elements of Torture
As discussed above, three elements must be present in any torture case: an intentional act, which causes severe pain or suffering, committed with a given purpose.
Intentional Act
The act of torture must be committed deliberately and not as a result of negligent conduct, an accident, or force majeure. 103 Generally, the intent of the perpetrator is irrelevant in IHRL. 104 A violation of a State's international obligations can be established even if the identity of the perpetrators is unknown. What is decisive is whether a breach has occurred 'with the support or the acquiescence of the government'. 105 The element of intent does not involve a subjective inquiry into the motivations of the perpetrators, but rather must be objectively determined under the circumstances.
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Corporal punishments are always intentional, just like any other punishment is. No one is punished by accident. So, in principle, all forms of corporal punishments fulfill this element.
Severe Pain or Suffering
The agony required for a treatment to be considered torture must be 'severe'. The high level of pain and suffering serves three purposes: (a) it is a distinguishing factor between torture and CIDP, 107 (b) it prevents the term 'torture' to be used in an inflationary manner that trivializes its special stigma as one of the 'worst possible human rights violations and abuses human beings can inflict upon each other', 108 and (c) it limits the weight of cultural relativist arguments. 109 The evaluation of the pain and suffering should be made on a case-by-case basis taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, in view of objective and subjective factors. The former refer to the characteristics of mistreatment, such as the nature and manner used to inflict harm. The latter refer to the characteristics of the individual undergoing the acts.
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The nature of a punishment could be egregious at first sight, because of its obvious brutal character (e.g.
amputation of a limb, disfiguration with acid, infliction of one hundred strokes), or more dubious and not to be immediately called vicious (e.g. cold baths, stinging nettles, infliction of five strokes). The manner in which the treatment is carried out may clarify its (non-)atrocious nature. The length of time the victim endures the pain, the instruments used to produce harm, the number of incidents of violence, the context in which the treatment is inflicted, and other relevant circumstances shall be looked at.
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Next, the subjective factor of the victim must be studied. Although each human being is different and experiences pain in different ways, (inter)national courts should analyze the effects that the treatment in question would have 'upon the average prudent person' within the (inter)national community. 112 After that, the particular characteristics (age, sex, health, etc.) of the victim may expand the reasoning. 113 The culture of the individual that endures the treatment is one of such particular characteristics. 114 Even the perception of pain is influenced by cultural attitudes and background. 115 Consequently, the steps that should be followed when the severity of the pain or suffering is analyzed are:
(1) to examine the objective factors (nature and manner) of the act; (2) to look at the effects of the act upon the average prudent person within the local, regional, or international community, depending on whether the examiner is a local authority, a regional court, or an international court; (3) to analyze the particular characteristics and conditions of the victims, including their culture, and (4) to look at the social and cultural context that surrounds the act. After this process, the examiner may be in a better position to declare whether or not the pain produced by the act in question reaches the severity threshold torture requires.
Purpose
The purposive element is not only essential but also a distinguishing feature of torture. 116 As seen above, both the UNCAT and the IACPPT list the purposes that the perpetrator must posses upon inflicting the act of torture. 117 Several authors maintain that corporal punishments imposed in certain indigenous communities in Ecuador do not intent (only) to punish the perpetrator; they rather serve as spiritual cleansing and purification of the wrongdoer, and to restore the social harmony of the community, using materials provided by the 'Holy Earth'. 118 For instance, in certain communities the use of stinging nettles and baths absent, or vice versa, the purpose is there but not the severe suffering, and the punishment will not amount to torture, simply because it does not meet the requirements set by the IHRL definition of torture.
Conversely, if severe pain or suffering is inflicted with a 'forbidden' purpose, the punishment will amount to torture and no cultural argument can be used as a justification. It does not necessary mean that culture shall be excluded ab initio. Culture has a role to play in the assessment of the objective and subjective factors. The cultural environment in which the punishment is imposed, and the culture of the individual enduring the act are both relevant factors to be taken into consideration, but their weight is relative. Other factors, such as the nature of the act, the manner in which pain is inflicted, or different subjective characteristics of the victim must also been looked at.
As a result, corporal punishments will amount to torture in some cases, but not in all cases, which reinforces my argument: IHRL should not always forbid corporal punishments. Yet, another question still remains: whether corporal punishments that fell short of torture can still be CIDP.
VI. Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Punishments
The prohibition of torture includes a prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishments (CIDP) and also cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatments (CIDT). 124 However, IHRL does not provide a definition of the latter. As a consequence, they are commonly defined by their distinction from torture.
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Acts falling short of torture, due to the absence of either the element of intent or the purposive element, may still be considered cruel or inhuman, while acts aimed at humiliating the victim are considered degrading even where pain has not been inflicted. However, as stated above, punishments cannot be imposed unintentionally, and it is hard to believe that a sanction lacks the purpose of punishing. The 124 ICCPR art. 7; ACHR art. 5(2); UNCAT art 16; IACPPT, arts. 6 and 7. 125 Special Rapporteur on torture, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, supra note 37, ¶ 186.
distinguishing factor is then the intensity of suffering. If pain reaches the 'severe' threshold, the acts amount to torture, otherwise they will not, 126 but they may amount to CIDP.
Similarly, as was stated above, some indigenous communities in Ecuador do not consider certain acts as punishments; instead they believe that such acts are part of a cleansing ritual. If such acts do not fulfill the purposive element, they cannot be labeled as torture, and since they are not punishments, they neither can be regarded as CIDP. Nevertheless, they can still be considered CIDT, because the notion of 'treatment' goes beyond the notion of 'punishment' and covers all kinds of acts inflicted upon the victim. 127 Therefore, the distinguishing factor between torture and CIDT in these cases is the purposive element.
Whatever the difference between torture and other 'lesser' forbidden acts is, the latter needs to cross a line in the 'suffering scale' in order to come into the IHRL prohibition. In an approach that originated within the ECtHR, international bodies have held that the harm suffered must attain a minimum level of severity to be regarded as cruel, inhuman, or degrading. Acts that cause little or no physical or mental harm do not amount to prohibited treatments or punishments. 128 The assessment of this 'minimum level of severity' follows the same rules as the ones described above for the 'pain or suffering' element of torture, but threshold to reach is lower. Torture requires the suffering to be 'severe', but CIDT and CIDP call for the suffering or humiliation to be 'intense' or 'serious', which requires 'more than just a minor impairment on mental or physical abilities, and must go beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation'. 129 The Constitutional Court of Colombia, for instance, considered that two types of corporal punishments (el fuete-whip-and el cepo-stocks) imposed by indigenous communities in that country, despite the physical rigors involved, were applied in a manner in which no serious physical or mental harm was produced and that they were not intended to denigrate de defendants. The Court found no violation of the right to personal integrity. 130 As to the Ecuadorian context, some authors have stressed that although indigenous corporal punishments cause pain, in the majority of cases they are of short duration, do not cause permanent and irreparable damage, do not involve vital organs of the body, are dosed, are not unlimited, and from an indigenous conception are not infamous. 131 Consequently, if the harm or humiliation does not reach the level of 'serious', indigenous corporal punishments or treatments do no amount to CIDP or CIDT, and therefore shall not be forbidden by IHRL. However, the harm reaching the level of 'serious' does not automatically mean that it shall be considered cruel, inhuman, or degrading. CIDT and CIDP are by definition relative concepts. 132 In certain scenarios, the use of force is allowed, but it must respect the principle of proportionality. This principle requires the legality of the use of force under domestic law, that a legitimate purpose is aimed for, and a fair balance between the purpose of the measure and the interference with the right to personal integrity of the persons affected. 133 As discussed above, indigenous corporal punishments are lawful, because the Ecuadorian Constitution recognizes the right to maintain ICL, and punishments are an integral part of ICL. The purpose of these punishments are common to national law sanctions (deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, prevention), but are also intended to achieve purposes that indigenous peoples find important (recovery of the harmony, reconciliation). The last step in the proportionality test is the determining factor (finding a review indigenous sanctions, should first analyze whether the punishments are proportional according to the values and ways of thinking of the indigenous people concerned. Therefore, the alleged excessiveness of a punishment should be measured primarily against the limits established by prior practice of the relevant indigenous community. 'If a punishment is significantly harsher than prior practice would permit for a given crime, the punishment is […] presumptively cruel. Such a punishment would only be upheld in the rare circumstance in which the increase could be justified as a matter of retribution'.
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Only after the proportionality of the punishment is assessed, the examiner would be in a better position to declare that the sanction is cruel, inhuman, or degrading, and that at the same time the cultural values of the indigenous people concerned are best respected.
VII. Final Conclusions
ICL has always coexisted with national law throughout the history of Ecuador. At first it was tolerated, then it became illegal, and now it is fully recognized by the Constitution and by International Law. An integral part of ICL is the power to enact and apply punishments. Such punishments are in principle lawful, because of the broad wording of the constitutional recognition. A number of sanctions and the rituals that precede them have a physical component. As a result, indigenous peoples and Ecuadorian authorities are engaged in a debate over the compatibility of such punishments with human rights. Some maintain that corporal sanctions violate the prohibition of torture and CIDP. Indigenous peoples respond that their traditional practices must be respected. I have argued that not all corporal punishments amount to torture or forbidden treatments or punishments, and that the assessment of the elements of these notions should always include the culture of the concerned indigenous community.
Despite the lack of uniformity of the definition of torture in IHRL, three elements were identified as an integral part of this evil. To be considered as torture the act must be intentional, must cause severe pain or suffering, and must have a 'forbidden' purpose. Indigenous corporal punishments always fulfill the element of intent, but not always fulfill the purposive or the 'severe pain or suffering' elements. Without one of these elements, the punishment simply will not amount to torture, because it does not meet the requirements set by the IHRL definition of torture.
On the other hand, the concepts of CIDT and CIDP do not require the act to be intentional or to have a purpose, but they do call for the act to cause 'serious' pain, suffering, or degradation. Minor acts of discomfort, shame, or embarrassment, as well as mild pain or suffering, do not reach the IHRL prohibition. Consequently, I argue that indigenous peoples have a margin of action that allows them to impose corporal punishments that do not enter into the scope of such prohibition.
The assessment of the severity of the act includes objective and subjective factors. The former refer to the characteristics of mistreatment, such as the nature and manner used to inflict harm. The latter refer to the characteristics of the individual undergoing the act. Culture has a role to play in both. As to the manner, the cultural context of the act makes a difference. Indigenous punishments usually are not intended to simply cause pain; they are part of a ritual used to repair the victims of the offense, to reinstate the harmony in the community, and to avoid private vengeance against the defendants. The ritual permits the offenders to 'return' to the community as full members. The acts are not considered barbaric or infamous, but as part of a process to restore the broken balance.
As to the characteristics of the individuals undergoing the treatment, their culture is also important.
Certain acts that one culture considers offensive or impermissible, other cultures may accept or consider desirable. Even the perception of pain is different between cultures. Additionally, the individuals undergoing the treatment may accept it as a fair sanction for their crime, or may prefer the sanctions imposed by their own communities to the sanctions imposed by the State.
However, one should take in to consideration that the above-mentioned factors have a relative weight.
Some other factors that should also be taken into account may reveal that the punishment in question reached the level of 'serious' or 'severe' agony or humiliation, and therefore entered into the scope of IHRL prohibition. The key issue here is to analyze all relevant factors and to weigh them according to the particularities of the case at hand. General answers that accept or reject ab initio the imposition of corporal punishments should, therefore, be avoided. That seems to be the main flaw in the arguments of most international bodies and Ecuadorian authorities, which reject indigenous corporal punishments without even looking at the particularities of each case or assessing the elements of torture and illtreatments.
Culture has also a role to play in the concepts of torture and ill-treatments in se. The evolving nature of these evils allows us to reject acts that in the past were tolerated. Our values determine whether we depart from previous practices. However, before any international authority declares that an 'evolution' has taken place, it should discover that enough nations agree on that, otherwise the values of one society may be imposed onto others. At the national level, before any domestic authority declares that the country will not tolerate certain acts, it shall hear the indigenous peoples' voice; otherwise the democratic nature of such declaration is to be doubted.
Moreover, our moral values and legal principles determine which punishments are lawful and therefore excluded from the scope of the IHRL prohibition. The UNCAT and the IACPPT both state that pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions are not included in the prohibition. However, internationally accepted punishments, such as imprisonment and capital punishment, may cause more damage than indigenous corporal punishments. If IHRL is meant to protect individuals from the abuse of States, it would be illogical to say that IHRL demands that indigenous peoples ignore their cultural practices by starting to utilize 'civilized' punishments such as imprisonment.
willing to tolerate that the defendants are subject to more pain and suffering. The answer to this dilemma is not to reject corporal punishment altogether, but to make an effort to understand the cultural context in which it is applied and to discover if it truly exceeds the threshold of pain, suffering, and shame. This threshold should attempt to be as egalitarian as possible in respect to the punishments imposed by different cultures. A comparison between the consequences produced by imprisonment and by corporal punishments in the particular case might shed some light on this issue.
Finally, the alleged excessiveness of a punishment should be measured primarily against the boundaries established by prior practice of the relevant indigenous community. If a punishment is significantly harsher, it is presumptively cruel.
Taking all of the above into consideration, I argue that IHRL should grant a margin of appreciation to
States such as Ecuador, so that other types of sanctions that are considered lawful by indigenous peoples could be accommodated.
